Judicial Review of Zoning Adminstration by Pelletier, Richard A.
Cleveland State University
EngagedScholarship@CSU
Cleveland State Law Review Law Journals
1973
Judicial Review of Zoning Adminstration
Richard A. Pelletier
Follow this and additional works at: https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev
Part of the Administrative Law Commons, Land Use Law Commons, and the State and Local
Government Law Commons
How does access to this work benefit you? Let us know!
This Comment is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at EngagedScholarship@CSU. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Cleveland State Law Review by an authorized editor of EngagedScholarship@CSU. For more information, please contact library.es@csuohio.edu.
Recommended Citation
Comment, Judicial Review of Zoning Adminstration, 22 Clev. St. L. Rev. 349 (1973)
Judicial Review of Zoning Administration
T HE PRECURSOR OF THE MODERN ZONING ORDINANCE was promul-
gated by the City Council of New York City on July 25, 1916
when that body enacted the New York Building Zone Regulation.1
Ten years subsequent to that resolution, the United States Supreme
Court, in Euclid v. Ambler Realty, gave judicial endorsement to
the zoning concept of land use control when Justice Sutherland
enunciated for the majority that a city could enach such legislation
under the auspices of its delegated police power.2 From those two
major events, zoning has evolved into its present state of confusion
involving the interrelation of legislative, administrative and judicial
functions.
This discussion will focus on the role of the courts in zoning
administration -judicial review. More specifically, the limitations
of that role, as it is now employed, will be examined with a sug-
gested alternative. However, beforye a meaningful explanation of
that topic can be undertaken it is necessary to provide a brief de-
scription of the zoning procedure before judicial review is sum-
moned into the fray. For this reason, the initial portion of this
comment is devoted to a general discussion of the source of the
municipality's authority to promulgate zoning ordinances, and the
makeup and function of the local zoning board. Provided with this
background, one should be better able to appreciate the problems
encountered by the courts when judicial review is applied.
The Origin of Zoning Authority and the Board of Zoning Appeals
In Ohio, the axiom for municipal ordainment of zoning regula-
tions is Article XVIII, See. 3 of the State Constitution, the home
rule provision for a municipal corporation.3 Refinement on the pro-
cedure is afforded by the municipal charter,4 with final specifica-
tions and possible deviations for a particular area enumerated in
the zoning ordinance.5 The two latter pronouncements have the com-
mon source of the State's police power as delegated to the city.6
"ZONING VARIANCE IN NEW YORK CITY," 3 COLUMBIA JOURNAL OF LAW & SOCIAL
PROBLEMS 120 (1967).
2 Eudid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926).
310 OHIO JUR. 2d CONSTITUTIONAL LAW §228 (1954). In Ohio a municipal corporation is
able to enact zoning ordinances without a state enabling statute. Young, 'The Regulation
& Removal of Non-Conforming Uses," 12 W. ReS. L. REv. 681, 683 (1961).
4 C. CRAWFORD, STRATEGY & TACTICS IN MUNICIPAL ZONING 104 §11.2 (1969) (here-
inafter cited as "CRAWFORD"].
ild.
'See Nectow v. Cambridge, 277 U.S. 183, 188 (1928), where J. Sutherland states n his
opinion "Government power to interfere by zoning regulation with the general rights of the
landowner by restricting the charactes of his use is not unlimited ... such restriction cannot
be imposed unless it bears a substantial relation to public health, safety, morals or general
welfare. See also, Cleveland Trust Co. v. Brooklyn, 92 Ohio App. 351, 110 N.E.2d 440
(1952).
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Thus, in accordance with the normal limitations on police powers,
such zoning regulations must have a tendency to serve the health,
safety, morals or general welfare of the community.'
Theoretically, zoning precepts reflect a precise weighing of
public interests and private deprivation in their application. To
accomplish what is not readily possible by the naked zoning resolu-
tion, an administration agency is established to exercise amelioration
in varying the stringent letter of those ordinances. The purpose of
this agency is to provide the necessary flexibility when conditions
warrant, 9 alleviate the hardships an individual situation may cause
and generally prevent the ordinance from becoming the unconstitu-
tional taking of property from the land owner without due process
of law.10
The local administrative medium (hereinafter referred to as
the "board" or "agency") thus becomes the heart of zoning applica-
tion. Its powers have been delegated to it by the city council12 to
exercise discretionary authority upon request for variations, excep-
tions, non-conforming uses and accessory uses.'3 Dissatisfied prop-
erty owners can appeal to this board from adverse ruling by the
administrative officer (typically the building commissioner) or re-
quest one of the above-mentioned alterations to the zoning ordinance.14
The typical agency is composed of local citizens appointed by
the mayor with the approval of council.' 5 Qualifications vary, but
7 J. ADAMS, ~MUNICIPAL ZONING," MUNICIPAL LAW CONFERENCE (OHIO LEGAL CENTER
INST. REFERENCE MANUAL FOR CONTINUED EDUCATION) 11.02 (73-1972).
$In re Appeal of Clements, 2 Ohio App. 2d 201 at 207, 207 N. E. 2d 573, 577 (1965).
"Zoning regulations must be strictly construed because [they are) in derogation of property
owner's constimtonal rights" C. J. Bell of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court in Cleaver v.
Bd. of Adj. of Tredyfrin Township, 414 Pa. 367, 200 A.2d 408, 412 (1964). Comment,
"Judiciai Control over Zoning Boards of Appeals: Suggestions for Reform," 12 U.C.L.A.
L. REV. 937, 951 (1964-65).
10 Bieger v. Moreland Hills, 3 Ohio App. 2d 32, 37, 209 N. F. 2d 218, 221 (1965).
Under some zoning systems the planning commission can be the administrative body with
authoriry equivalent to the board of zoning appeals. N. MARCUS & M. GROVES, THE NEW
ZONING: LEGAL ADMINISTRATION AND ECONOMIC CONCEPTS AND TECHNIQUES 5
(1970). [hereinafter cited as "MARCUS"]. Future reference to the board of zoning appeals
herein will be synonymous to board of adjustments, planning commission, or whatever the
name is attached to the agency which performs a similar function.
121. XXi.
13 Uses not according to zoning ordinances: 1) Exceptions; ordinance specifically allows a
property owner to use his property in the manner other than primarily intended by the
enactment if certain conditions exist. 2) Variances; board can hear a request by an owner
to use land not in accordance with the ordinance. 3) Non-conforming uses; uses in
existance when the ordinance was effective but does not comply with zoning regulation.
4) Accessory uses; incident to conforming use but not sanctioned by ordinance. Young,
"The Regulation and Removal of Non-Conforming Uses," 12 W. RES. L. REV. 681, 684-
655 (1961).
'
4 MARCUS, spra note 11 at 97.
"'WARRENSVILLE HEIGHTS (OHIO) CITY CHARTER, art. V §8(b). Such a provision is
typical and the above is cited only as an example.
[Vol. 22:349
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the average member is not trained in the law, is in "harmony" with
local public opinion, has close association with those in the com-
munity and is familiar with the general areas of the city.16 The
local nature of zoning issues lend credence to the last three quali-
fications,17 Likewise, the parochial characteristics of land use tend
to justify autonomous responsibility and control of zoning varia-
tions accomplished through these agencies. It must be noted, how-
ever, that these same close community alliances of the board's
members, coupled with their non-legal background, can be a pro-
lific source of problems 8 when the requirements of due process are
considered.
In light of the reality of the board's makeup and the political
considerations involved, an adequate safeguard must be installed to
check possible abuses of discretion.19 The lack of a specific admin-
istrative "watchdog" has been noted as one of the major deficiencies
in the present system 20 and that inadequacy has caused an undue
burden on judicial review as an attempt to impose some licit order
and form in the execution of zoning decisions. 21 Because the courts
are generally an unwilling recipient of this responsibility, judicial
review of zoning administration is, at best, "fraught with difficulty. ' 2
Judicial Review of Zoning Administration
Due to the absence of an administrative check on local zoning,
judicial review has been historically relied on to provide control.3
The essence of the court's action in this capacity is to "control the
's Comment, "Judicial Control over Zoning Boards of Appeal: Suggestions for Reform," 12
U.C.L.A. L. REV. 937, 946 (1964-65) [Hereinafter cited as "Comment"]
' D. MANDELKER, THE ZONING DILEMMA: A LEGAL STUDY FOR URBAN CHANGE 3
(1971). [Hereinafter cited as "MANDELKER")
"CRAWFORD, supra note 4 at 37 §3.2; McCarty, "Zoning and the Property Rights of Others,"
48 MASS. L. R. 473, 499-500 (1963); Comment, supra note 16 at 946 & 953. The fol-
lowing was quoted in Michalski, "Zoning - The National Peril," Planning 62-64 (1963)
[selected papers from the Annual Planning Conference of the American Society of Plan-
ning Officials] as quoted in R. BABCOCK, THE ZONING GAME 91 (1966):
Many planning commission hearings have taken on the characters of an oriental
bazar where applicants wheel and deal with the commission on conditions and
restrictions to be imposed on zoning ... Two often decisions are not based on facts
or master plans, but on pressures of bitterly complaining or approving neighbor-
hood improvement associations ... The protection of health, safety and general
welfare has been forgotten in the desire to control corpetition, keep out for-
eigners, favor special interests, obtain public right of way zor free, a ne tax users
out and high tax payers in.
"Comment, supra note 16 at 93/.
2ODowd, The Courts as a Restraint on Administrative Power: A Comparative Study in Con-
stittsional Theory, 40 U. DET. L. J. 597, 615 (1962-63).
2 MANDELKER, sspra note 17 at 4; Comnaent, sspra note 16 at 944. The purpose of judical
review is generally to insure that the actions of an agency have been "in accordance with
the cherished judicial traditions embodying the basic concepts of fair play. See also Morgan
v. United States, 304 U.S. 1, 22 (1937).
22 B. YOKLEY, ZONING LAW AND PRACTICE 341 §18 7 (3rd ed. 1965) [Hereinafter cited
as "YOKLEY"'.
23 MANDELKER, shpra note 17 at 4.
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administrative action [of the local zoning board] against the frame-
work of statutory guidelines."24 The courts are utilized for this
function (judicial review of zoning) in all the states2s in varying
degrees of importance and impact depending, primarily, on whether
a trial de novo is allowed or not. As a caveat, however, authors have
warned that judicial review should not be regarded as a panacea.26
The local boards exercise the discretionary authority involved and
the courts act in a general form of supervision to avoid only the
flagrant abuses of such power by the agency?2 As Justice Mowbray
of the Supreme Court of Nevada noted in Coronet Homes, Inc. v.
McKenzie, "Courts are becoming increasingly aware that they are
neither super boards of [appeals] nor planning commissions of the
last resort." 8 Functionally, the courts are to determine if the board's
action was arbitrary on the basis of that agency's evidence. 2' The
resulting dilemma for judicial review is, generally, how to impose
a safeguard against board abuses and not interfere with the op-
erational effectiveness.3
The statutory means, in Ohio, of appealing to the courts from
an adverse board decision, to test either the validity of the ordi-
nance or solicit perusal of the final administrative order, is Sec.
2506.01 et. seq. of the Ohio Revised Code (ORC).31 This Section of
the Code does not intend to substitute the courts for the local
agency 32 but to provide the vehicle of access to the judiciary. Such
a provision is necessary considering that the Ohio Administrative
Procedure Act (Sec. 119.01 et, seq. of the ORC) applies only to des-
ignated State agencies. 33 Thus, the proper nexus between the zoning
2 Comment, supra note 16 at 944.
25 3 R. ANDERSON, AMERICAN LAW OF ZONING 544-545 §21.01 (1968).
26 "Zoning Variance in New YorA City," 3 COLUMBIA JOURNAL OF LAW AND SOCIAL
PROBLEMS 120, 133 (1967).
17 B. BOOLAY, PLANNING AND ZONING IN THE UNITED STATES 70 (1961).
"
tCoronet Homes, Inc. v. McKenzie, 439 P.2d 219, 223 (Nev. 1968).
29 23A S P 0 Zoning Diget 51 (1971) citing Wells v. Fiscal Ct. of Jefferson County, 457
S. W.2d 498 (Ky. 1970).
"'Comment, supra note 16 at 937.
31 Shaker Coventry Corp. v. Shaker Heights, 115 Ohio App. 472, 473, 180 N.E.2d 27, 29
(1962). Chapter 2506 of the Ohio Revised Code, Appeals from Orders of Administrative
Officers and Agencies, was promulgated to lend clarification to the procedual steps for
appeal from the final order of any agency of any political subdivision of the state not
otherwise designated within the Code. ORC §2506.1. The dual purpose of the enactment
is to protect the rights of the municipality (or any other subdivision) and ensure due
process protection for the individual. Koach," Appeals from Orders of Administrative
Agencies," MUNICIPAL LAW CONFERENCE (OHIO LEGAL CENTER INST. REFERENCE
MANUAL FOR CONTINUED EDUCATION) (73-1972).
22 Shelby Realty, Inc. v. Springdale, 27 Ohio App. 2d 204, 208, 273 N.E.2d 800, 802-803
(1971).
331 OHIO JUR. 2D ADMINISTRATIVE LAW & PROCEDURE §61 (1953).
[Vol. 22 ;349
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board and the court is Charter 2506 of the ORC. However, legisla-
tive action (enacting the zoning ordinance") is not appealable under
the above provisions.
A study of judicial review in this area is more properly an
examination of inadequacies rather than adequacies, as this tri-
bunal's power is limited, nearly to the point of impotency, by several
factors. Broadly, these factors include: 1) the necessity that the
administrative procedure be exhausted 36 and a final order be ob-
tained;3' 2) the presumption of validity given to the zoning ordi-
nance and the board actions; 3 and 3) the reluctance of the courts
to hear zoning cases.39
The initial curb, exhaustion of the administrative procedure, is
a usual feature of administrative law. Compliance with this re-
quirement should be alledged and the obtainment of a final order
is essential.4 0 On the surface, then, there appears to be nothing more
restrictive here than in any other appeal from a board action to the
courts. However, in the administration of local zoning, a point of
disarrangement arises in some cases when the query is, which body
issues the final administrative order?
Logic would imply that the administrative agency, be it the
board of zoning appeals or the planning commission, would be the
procedural terminal point. Some municipalities, however, afford an
appeal from such an agency to the city council or reserve final ap-
proval for that body,4' the legislative branch in the zoning system.
A final decision from the latter may thus have the aura of a legis-
lative action and possibly appear to be a bar to judicial review.
In Jacobs v. Maddux, C.J. William O'Neill of the Ohio Supreme
Court pronounced such activity by the city council to be executory
by the maxim that if settlement of such an appeal involves the
application of existing law it is an administrative function.42 This
served to expand the Ohio doctrine on the matter explained one
year earlier, that the granting of a variance was an administrative
" YOKLEY, sapra notw 22 at 363 § 18-6.
35 Berg v. Struthers, 176 Ohio St. 146, 198, N.E.2d 48 (1964).
"State ex rel Lieux v. Westlake, 154 Ohio St. 412, 96 N.E.2d 414 (1951).
3 State ex ret Forman v. Bellefontaine, 1 Ohio St. 2d 132, 205 N.F.2d 398 (1965);
Fleischmann v. Medina Supply Co., 111 Ohio App. 449, 453, 173 N.E.2d 168, 170 (1960).
'In re Appeal of McDonald, 119 Ohio App. 15, 16, 196 N.E.2d 333, 334 (1963) (case
later questioned on a different point).
tQMANDELKER, supra note 17.
10 State ev ret Foreman v. Bellefontaine, I Ohio St. 2d 132, 205 N.E.2d 398 (1965).
1 Donnelly v. Fairview Park, 13 Ohio St. 2d 1, 2, 233 N.E.2d 500, 501, (1968); In re
Appeal of Clcments, 2 Ohio App. 2d. 201, 207, 207 N.E.2d 573, 577 (1965).
42Jacobs v. Maddux, 7 Ohio St. 2d 21, 23, 218 N.E2d 460, 461 (1966)_
1973]
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endeavor regardless of which municipal commission or council
rendered it. 3 Further limpidity was provided by J. Zimmerman
when he stated that a legislative body could indeed operate in an
administrative capacity, the test being whether such activity was
the making of a law or the executing of one already in existence."
Thus, it now appears well settled that when the legislative body
of a city reserves powers to itself which are customarily discharged
by an agency, the council's decision is subject to judicial review."
The council's action under such conditions is simply not legislative
in nature and, therefore, appealable.4' One must bear in mind, how-
ever, that this duty of the legislature is the granting of a variance,
exception, etc. and not the initial enactment of a zoning ordinance.
J. Oppenheimer of the Maryland Court of Appeals made a
pungent observation in Poe v. Baltimore when he noted, "There are
few absolutes in the law, and the rule that an administrative remedy
must be exhausted before recourse is had to the courts is not one
of them." 4' This is true in Ohio, as it is elsewhere and the courts
will not require the doing of a vain act 48 or pursuing an administra-
tive process that cannot afford an adequate remedy.49 Unfortunately,
when it is observed that procedural ignorance reigns supreme in
zoning application at the local (and higher) level, it is easy to under-
stand why an applicant may exhaust himself before his administra-
tive remedies and thus not employ the court's aid when appropriate.
To better appreciate the second tempering factor, the presump-
tion of validity allocated to the zoning enactment, it is necessary
to observe that when an appeal is brought to and accepted by the
court for review, the judiciary poses three general queries: 1) Did
the administrative agency possess the requisite power and authority
to render the decision? 2) Was due process afforded the applicant?
3) Did the agency abuse its discretion? D These questions are not
all present in every zoning review case but depend on the issues
raised by the appellant. They do serve as a preface to the relatively
narrow perusal given by the court.
431In re Appeal of Clements, 2 Ohio App. 2d 201, 209, 207 N.E.2d 573, 579 (1965).
44Donnelly v. Fairview Park, 13 Ohio St. 2d 1, 3, 233 N.E.2d 500, 502 (1968).
45R. ANDERSON, AMERIcAN LAw OF ZoNiNG 551, 555-556 §21,04 (1968).
45Bieger v. Moreland Hills, 3 Ohio App. 2d 32, 37, 209 N.E.2d 218, 222 (1965).
"Poe v. Balitmore, 241 Md. 303, 306, 216 A.2d 707, 709 (1966).
40 Killeen Realty Co. v. East Cleveland, 169 Ohio St. 375, 378-379, 160 N.E.2d 1, 4 (1959).
"Cubbon v. Winterfeld, 104 Ohio App. 260, 264, 148 N.E.2d 523, 526 (1957).
50 Reid v. Cleveland Heights, 119 Ohio App. 67, 68, 192 N.E.2d 74, 75 (1963). The fourth
question, was the ordinance constitutional? is too involved to warrant treatment here.
[Vol. 22:349
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The first inquiry is usually settled by making reference to the
city's charter and/or the zoning ordinance involved. The board's
powers are delegated to it by the city council and, as has been men-
tioned previously, the two bodies are interwoven closely enough so
that seldom will the authority necessary not have been executed
properly by someone.
The light impact of the second and third interrogatories are
more readily appreciated when consideration is given to the fact
that the local board can formulate its own fact finding procedure.5'
Couple this with the premises that Ohio with certain qualifications
does not allow for a trial de novo in appeals from administrative
agencies 2 and that the court's interrogation relies on the records as
supplied by the board from which the appeal originated. 3 It can
now be observed that due process may be lost in the administrative
maze and abuse of discretion would necessarily have to be flagrant
before prompting judicial response.
The necessity of providing clarification in the evidence gather-
ing procedure has not escaped the court's attention as can be seen
by the observation of J. Jones of the Geauga County Court of Ap-
peals, "A litigant ought not suffer the consequences of a procedure
that is , . . loose and indefinite."5 4 Referring to Chapter 2506 of
the ORC, the court concluded in Shaker Coventry Corp. v. Shaker
Heights, that it would grant broad discretion in admitting new evi-
dence considering that the administrative procedure of some boards
of zoning appeals are "not conducted with the considered delibera-
tion and objectivity warranted in every case."55 Thus, the judicial
amelioration of allowing additional evidence when required "in the
interest of justice"56 has given an applicant a slight chance to over-
come the parochial bias to which he may have been subjected. But,
if in fact this is a trend, it is apparently too slow, to indefinite, too
unclear and too subjective as to each court to be effective in im-
proving zoning law.
s Deibel v. Wilson, 77 Ohio L. Abs. 471, 475, 150 N.E.2d 448, 452 (Franklin Co. Ct.
of App. 1957).
521n re Appeal of Manning, 117 Ohio App. 55, 189 N.E.2d 651 (1962).
s" OEIO RFnv. CODE §2506.02.
5Chester Township v. Kline, 19 Ohio App. 2d 63, 66, 249 N.E.2d 921, 924 (1969).
55 Shaker Conventry Corp. v. Shaker Heights, 18 Ohio Op.2d 272, 275, 176 N.E.2d 332,
335 (C.P. Cuyahoga Co. 1961); aff'd 115 Ohio App. 472, 180 N.E.2d 27 (1962); appeal
dismissed 173 Ohio Sr. 572, 184 N.E.2d 212 (1962).
56Vlad v. Cleveland, 111 Ohio App. 70, 74, 164 N.E.2d 797, 800 (1962) The court
explained that under OHIO REV. CODE §2506.03 the Common Pleas Court could admit new
evidence in such a situation.
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Thus, the second limitation, the presumption of validity given
to the zoning enactment and the administrative decision, has a
tendency to frustrate supervisory control by the courts57 as it nearly
requires a judicial finding of board misconduct before a discretionary
decision of the latter can be interfered with by the courts.? Some
authors believe such a "drastic" requirement is "unfortunate" as
it appears to pay tribunal homage to form rather than justice.
The burden of overcoming this prima facie validity falls upon
the applicant as the attacker of the board's decision or zoning ordi-
nance.6' He must cogently demonstrate that, 1) serious injury is
done to his land, and 2) the ukase is not a licit exercise of the muni-
cipality's delegated police power.61 Such a burden of proof weighs
heavily on the average applicant and may preclude his appeal to
judicial review, except in the most clearcut case of capricious dis-
cretionary abuse by the board.
The final barrier, and perhaps the most formidable, is the
court's reluctance to entertain zoning litigation. The extent of this
aversion is best manifested by statements from members of the
bench.
C.J. John C. Bell of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court allowed
publication of his sentiments when he was quoted by the "Washing-
ton Post" as saying, "[T he Pennsylvania Supreme Court no longer
will hear zoning and other cases of little significance ..."' Similar
attitudes are apparent in recorded decisions such as the First Na-
tional Bank and Trust Co. v. Evanston where the Illinois Supreme
Court refused to hear a zoning contest because it lacked the "sub-
stantial question" required by the amended state constitution.63
Georgia's highest court proclaimed that an alteration in that State's
constitution had accomplished what must be the epitome of local
autonomous land use control, stripped the court of judicial review
powers over zoning administration. 4 A summation and enlightening
"7 Comment, Judicial Control over Zoning Boards of Appeal. Suggestions for Reform, 12
U.C.L.A. L. REV. 937, 949 (1964-65).
M B. POOLEY, PLANNING & ZONING IN THE UNITED STATES 69 (1961).
s Id.
602 J. MEnZENBAuM, LAW Or ZONING 942 (2d cd. 1955).
61 In re Appeal of McDonald, 119 Ohio App. 15, 16, 196 N.E.2d 333, 334 (1963) (later
questioned on a differeot point); Shopping Centers of Greater Cincinnati, Inc. v. Cincinnati
110 Ohio Op.2d 313, 315, 173 N.E.2d 196, 198 (C.P. Hamilton Co. 1958).
62"THE WASHINGTON PoST" (Dec- 1, 1963) as quoted in R. BABCOCK, THE ZONING
GAME 104 (1966).
" First Na 'l. Bank & Trust Co. v. Evanston, 30 Ill. 2d 479, 197 NE.2d 705, 707 (1964).
64Vulcan Mat'l. Co. v. Griffith, 114 S.E.2d 29 (Ga. 1960).
[Vol. 22 :349
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explanation was supplied by C.J. Duckworth of that court when he
stated, "We [the courts] have neither the information nor desire
to make public policy in respect to legislative uses of private
property.""
This admitted lack of expertise, allied with the incredible
"mishmash" of local procedure and factual "brambles"" thus gen-
erated makes the courts' reluctance to deal with zoning cases under-
standable. The courts are, as has been noted above, hesitant to look
at the fairness of zoning application and the criteria upon which
such decisions are made at the local level.67 Notwithstanding the
improvements noted, the effectiveness of judicial review over zon-
ing administration, as it now prevails, appears thwarted.
Alternative to Judicial Review
Judicial review is not the problem. The difficulty lies in the
chaotic condition of the subject matter when presented to the court
for its perusal. This disarray is spawned by the lack of uniformity
at the local level. Apparently, the means of clarification is via legis-
lative action to install the requisite procedural guide for zoning
appeals boards and creation of a "watchdog" agency." This last
suggestion alone may prove valuable, as it would establish an ad-
ministrative body more remote from the emotional aspects under
which the local boards labor. Theoretically, such an agency would
be the buffer between the courts and community and could serve as
an arbitration on application of zoning ordinances and overseer on
local board procedure.
This structure is modeled on the English system. There, a four
step process is applied in land control:
1) There is a general plan, but no zoning ordinance, speci-
fied by local application, not by predetermination,
2) A land owner applies to local authorities for permission
for specific development.
3) The authority to grant permission for land use is in local
officials.
4. There is a national ministry to review the local decision
upon appeal by the applicant.6
61Id. at 33.
MR. BABCOCK, Tu4 ZONING GAME 106 (1966).
") MANDELKER, supra note 17 at 71.
64Dowd, The Courfs as a Restrain; on Administrative Power: A Comparative Study in
Constitutional Theory, 40 U. DET. LJ. 597, 615 (1962-63).
69 MANDELKER, supra note 17 at xi.
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With the exception of predetermination by means of the zoning
ordinance and lack of administrative overseering, the Ohio format
is structurally similar to the English procedure. With the retention
of the former and addition of the latter, judicial review could be
reassigned a more productive role in zoning administration.
The proposed agency could be state or county wide. How broad
or narrow its powers would be is debatable, but generally should
not be extended to interfere with the local promulgation of zoning
ordinances. Basically, its functions should include, 1) clarifying
uniform procedures for local board hearings and evidence gather-
ing duties, and 2) providing a more objective administrative appel-
late body before judicial review is resorted to by the municipality.
This format should then provide the courts with a more lucid and
accurate transcript for utilization in judicial review.
Conclusion
The premise throughout this discussion has been that the
present system of judicial review in zoning administration is in
need of amendment. The courts appear uncomfortable and mal-
equipped in their role, the property owner is often denied use of
his land without due process, and the local board is uncertain (and
occasionally unconcerned) as to the extent of its authority under the
city zoning ordinance and administrative law. A plan akin to that
proposed above could afford a balancing of the municipality's legiti-
mate concern in keeping land use control parochial and protection
of the land owner against deprivation of his property without due
process.
Richard A. Pelletiert
t Law Review Candidate, second year student, The Cleveland State University College of Lw.
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